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When criminal bands become signifi cant enough in size and in their predations or when governments enlist signifi cant numbers of criminals into their military forces, criminal warfare ensues. Something similar holds for the relation of terrorism to disciplined warfare. When disciplined methods are applied sporadically and by individuals or small groups, the process can be designated "terrorism." When such violence is perpetrated by substantial groups and becomes continuous or sustained enough, it will look like, and be called, "war."
Th is essay explores and extrapolates from these distinctions.
Diff erentiating between disciplined and criminal warfare
Broadly speaking, there seem to be two methods for developing combat forces -for successfully cajoling or coercing collections of men into engaging in the violent, profane, sacrifi cial, uncertain, masochistic, and essentially absurd enterprise known as war. Th e two methods lead to two kinds of warfare: criminal warfare and disciplined warfare. Intuitively, it might seem that the easiest (and cheapest) method for recruiting combatants would be to enlist people who revel in violence and routinely seek it out or who regularly employ it to enrich themselves, or both. We have in civilian life a name for such people -criminals -but the category would also encompass people popularly known as bullies, hooligans, toughs, goons, and thugs. Violent confl icts in which people like that dominate can be called criminal warfare, a form in which combatants are induced to wreak violence primarily for the fun and material profi t they derive from the experience.
Criminal armies arise from a couple of processes. Sometimes criminalsrobbers, brigands, freebooters, highwaymen, hooligans, thugs, bandits, pirates, gangsters, outlaws -organize or join themselves together in gangs, bands, or mafi as. When such organizations become big enough, they can look and act a lot like full-blown armies.
Criminal armies can also form when a government or ruler needs combatants to prosecute a war and concludes that the employment or impressment of criminals and thugs is the most sensible or direct method for accomplishing this. In this case, criminals and thugs essentially act as mercenaries.
As it happens, criminals and thugs tend to be undesirable warriors, however much they may be drawn to combat by their inclination to relish violence or to fi nd profi t in it. To begin with, they can be trouble-makers: unruly, disobedient, and mutinous, often committing unauthorized crimes while on duty (or even off duty) that can be detrimental or even destructive to the military enterprise. Th is natural unruliness is often enhanced by the deprivation and boredom that commonly envelop the long periods between military actions.
Most importantly, criminals can be disinclined to stand and fi ght when things become dangerous, and they often simply desert when whim and opportunity coincide. Ordinary crime, after all, preys on the weak -on little old ladies rather than on husky athletes -and criminals often make willing and able executioners of defenseless people.
1 However, if the cops show up they are given to fl ight. Th e motto for the criminal, after all, is not a variation of "semper fi ," "all for one and one for all," "duty, honor, country," "Banzai," or "remember Pearl Harbor," but "take the money and run."
Indeed, for a criminal to perish in battle (or in the commission of a bank robbery) is essentially absurd. In general, then, although they seem to be more willing to accept risk than ordinary people and although they can be induced to engage in battle by the appeal of pay or booty and by the prospect of infl icting violence, they will tend to fi ght only when the probability of being killed is low enough or when they are massively coerced. In addition, the presence of such people in the ranks can aff ect the fi ghting morale of non-criminals in the combatant forces. Non-criminals routinely avoid criminals and other social undesirables in civilian life, and they may sensibly distrust their reliability in combat (McPherson, 1997, 8-9, 116) .
Th e discovery of these problems with the employment of criminals as combatants has historically led to eff orts to recruit ordinary men as combatants -people who, unlike criminals and thugs, commit violence at no other time in their lives (though they may watch a lot of it on television). Combat studies, in fact, generally fi nd performance positively correlated with social class,
